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EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION REFORM:
PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO CLASS PROCEEDINGS
IN WORKPLACE DISPUTES
Javier J. Castro*
The recent judicial enforcement of class waivers in arbitration agreements has gen-
erated ample debate over the exact reach of these decisions and their effects on the
future of collective action for consumers and employees.  In AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court majority held that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted state laws prohibiting companies from incorporat-
ing class action waivers into arbitration agreements. The Court upheld such
waivers on the grounds that they are consistent with the language and underlying
purpose of the FAA. Most courts across the country have since reinforced the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration. This, in turn, has made it more difficult for
employees—most of whom do not enjoy the benefit of union representation and
must therefore arbitrate their claims as individuals—from engaging in class pro-
ceedings. Faced with this dire judicial landscape, employees must turn to Congress
to limit the scope of compulsory arbitration and secure recognition of the right to
class proceedings.
This Note advocates for legislative reform of federal arbitration law. Specifically, it
argues for an amendment to the FAA that invalidates class waivers in mandatory
arbitration agreements and applies only in employment disputes. Such a reform
would help preserve important employee protections under federal labor law and
would allow nonunion workers, in particular, to fully exercise their fundamental
right to collective action.
INTRODUCTION
At the intersection of federal arbitration and labor law lies a criti-
cal question: To what extent do class waivers in predispute
arbitration agreements affect—or rather, constrain—the substan-
tive rights of nonunion employees under federal labor law?1 The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) partially ad-
dressed this issue in December 2012, when it considered whether
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, University of Michigan Law School; B.A., 2009, Harvard
University. I would like to thank Professor Kate Andrias for her invaluable guidance and
insight, my fellow editors for their helpful feedback and assistance, and Jessica Leal for her
constant encouragement and support.
1. See Jay W. Waks & Carlos L. Lopez, Challenging AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: Employ-
ment Class Action Waivers and Federal Statutory Rights, 67 APR DISP. RESOL. J. 6, 76-79 (2012)
(discussing the impact of class action waivers in arbitration agreements on the rights of
employees).
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an employer may require employees, as a condition of employment,
to agree to arbitrate all employment on an individual basis. In D.R.
Horton, Inc.,2 the Board determined that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA)3 protects employees’ right to file or participate in
a class or collective action,4 notwithstanding the broad federal pol-
icy favoring individual arbitration. The Board reasoned that the
NLRA is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)5 because
it does not preclude arbitration agreements, so long as such agree-
ments do not bar employees from vindicating their right to engage
in concerted activity in either an arbitral or judicial forum.6 Recog-
nizing the right of employees to engage in “concerted activities” for
purposes of “mutual aid or protection,”7 the NLRB asserted its con-
tinued authority in resolving labor disputes and thereby sought to
preserve the continuity of collective action in the post-Concepcion
era,8 even amid the decline of union representation and the grow-
ing isolation of collective bargaining.9
By invalidating a mandatory arbitration clause barring class ac-
tions, the NLRB created a stir within labor and employment circles.
Many viewed D.R. Horton as a challenge to the Supreme Court’s lat-
est rulings supporting the broad enforceability of arbitration
clauses.10 Federal courts since, however, have generally declined to
defer to the NLRB’s reasoning and have responded by enforcing
class waivers in employment arbitration agreements.11 The Fifth Cir-
cuit recently delivered a serious blow to the Board’s authority when
it overturned D.R. Horton on appeal, thereby encouraging busi-
nesses to continue using mandatory arbitration agreements as a
2. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 151–69 (2012).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
5. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
6. D.R. Horton, supra note 2, at *17–18.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
8. See Craig Becker, The Continuity of Collective Action and the Isolation of Collective Bargain-
ing: Enforcing Federal Labor Law in the Obama Administration, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 401,
405–11 (2012).
9. See Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of
“Concert” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 287–88 (1981) (observ-
ing the decline in union representation of private-sector employees over the past two
decades).
10. See, e.g., William J. Emanuel & Henry D. Lederman, NLRA Versus FAA: Why the NLRB
Got It Wrong in D.R. Horton, LITTLER MENDELSON P.C. (July 18, 2012), http://www.littler
.com/publication-press/press/nlra-versus-faa-why-nlrb-got-it-wrong-dr-horton-july-2012 (ar-
guing that the Board’s decision in D.R. Horton infringes on a clear congressional directive to
enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms).
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.
FALL 2014] Employment Arbitration Reform 243
means of getting their employees to sign away their right to con-
certed activity.12 Further, this ruling signals to employees that if
they hope to preserve that right, they must seek reform not in the
courts but through the legislature.
This Note argues that Congress should enact a statutory amend-
ment to the FAA that bans enforcement of class waiver provisions in
mandatory arbitration agreements, which prevent employees from
aggregating their claims in any forum. Part I explains the statutory
and doctrinal development that makes such reform necessary. It
traces the rise of national labor policy in the twentieth century, cul-
minating with the passage of the NLRA, which fundamentally
transformed labor-management relations. The discussion then
shifts to focus on the development of federal arbitration policy and
the enactment of the FAA, which was designed to encourage private
dispute resolution. After analyzing the differences between the
NLRA and the FAA, this section highlights a number of key Su-
preme Court rulings that have broadened the applicability of the
FAA in resolving consumer and employment disputes.
Part II addresses the apparent conflict between the courts and
the NLRB over the enforceability of binding arbitration agreements
in the nonunion workplace. While the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts in recent years have strengthened the ability of em-
ployers to compel individual arbitration in the consumer contexts,13
the NLRB has continued its longstanding practice of defending the
substantive right of employees to engage in concerted activity for
the purpose of “mutual aid or protection.”14  This section concludes
by emphasizing the need for congressional action as a means of
restoring the status of national labor law and salvaging basic protec-
tions for nonunion employees. The focus throughout centers on
nonunion employees—who make up a vast majority of the private
sector workforce15—because they are often unable to bargain with
their employer, compared to their unionized counterparts who
benefit from having a union that can negotiate on their behalf.
12. D.R. Horton v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 345 (5th Cir. 2013).
13. See Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L.
REV. 767, 771-776 (2012) (analyzing Supreme Court decisions concerning class waivers and
disputes arising from consumer and employment contracts).
14. See Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action
Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1024–29 (2013); 29 U.S.C. § 157
(2012).
15. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2013, private-sector employees had a
union membership rate at about 6.7 percent. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0
.htm.
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Finally, Part III discusses a number of existing proposals that at-
tempt to make the current system of employment arbitration more
conducive to the needs of employees.16 After examining the merits
and drawbacks of each of these proposals, this Part emphasizes the
need for legislative reform that enables employees to engage in
class proceedings. Specifically, it argues in favor of an amendment
to the FAA that invalidates class waivers in mandatory arbitration
agreements, which bar employees from aggregating their claims in
any forum.17 This Part then justifies this proposed amendment in
light of the social policies it serves.18
As union membership declines precipitously across the country,19
many companies have turned to arbitration contracts to prevent
nonunion employees from asserting their right to collective ac-
tion.20 An amendment to the FAA would help stem the ongoing
erosion of employee rights.  It would also represent an important
step toward achieving Congress’s goal of remedying the “inequality
of bargaining power” between employers and employees, a princi-
ple enshrined in the opening lines of the NLRA.21
I. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND OF
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
To understand the contemporary debate over whether the FAA
applies to nonunion employees and their right to collective action
in arbitration, it is useful to begin by examining both the key fed-
eral statutes governing labor-management relations and arbitration
agreements, the NLRA and the FAA, and the relevant interpreta-
tions of those statutes by federal courts and the NLRB. Whereas the
NLRA instituted important protections for the substantive rights of
employees, the FAA granted companies the right to seek enforce-
ment of contracts requiring private resolution of disputes. But in a
16. See discussion infra Part III.A.
17. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
18. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
19. Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Workforce in a Union Falls to a 97-Year Low, 11.3%,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/business/union-
membership-drops-despite-job-growth.html.
20. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 883 (2008) (reporting that 92.9% of employment contracts contain
arbitration clauses).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“Experience has proved that protection by law of the right
of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impair-
ment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by . . . restoring equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees.”).
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number of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has authorized a
liberal interpretation the FAA.  Taken together, these decisions il-
lustrate the strong judicial endorsement of arbitration.
A. The NLRA and the Development of Protected Employee Conduct
The mid-1930s were a decisive period in the history of American
trade unionism. Following the collapse of the stock market, Con-
gress searched for ways to end the deepening depression and
stimulate the economy.22 Congress recognized that safeguarding
the right to organize and bargain collectively would promote the
free flow of commerce by removing certain “sources of industrial
strife,” encouraging the friendly adjustment of labor disputes and
restoring the “equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees.”23 As the middle class became more sympathetic to the
goals of organized labor, the federal government began to en-
courage unionization and collective bargaining.24
i. Text and Purpose of the NLRA
In 1935, Congress passed the NLRA (also known as the Wagner
Act)25 establishing legal protections for private-sector employees to
organize and bargain collectively over the terms and conditions of
employment,26 and creating the NLRB27 to administer28 and en-
force those legal protections should an employer’s conduct
constitute an unfair labor practice.29
22. Amanda L. Ireland, Note, Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act: A Turning Point for the National Labor Relations Board, 13 NEV. L.J. 937, 941 (2013).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
24. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 42 (Foundation Press, 15th
ed. 2011).
25. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012)). See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the
Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1385–86 (1993).
The Wagner Act was named after progressive New York Democrat and principal architect of
the legislation, Senator Robert F. Wagner. Id. at 1390.
26. COX, supra note 24, at 43.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)–(b) (2012).
28. Id. § 159; see also David P. O’Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The
NLRB and Methods of Statutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 181-83 (2008).
29. Id. § 158(a)(1) (forbidding an employer from “interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or
coerc[ing] employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed” by Section 157.).
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The core of the NLRA is Section 7,30 which guarantees that
“[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.”31 Section 7 grants employees the right, not just
to form or join labor organizations, but also to engage in a broad
array of concerted activities.
To be entitled to protection under this section, an employee
must satisfy two requirements. First, the conduct must be “con-
certed.” In other words, it must be “undertaken together by two or
more employees or undertaken by one on behalf of others.”32  Sec-
ond, employee conduct must be “for mutual aid or protection.”33
Analyzing the kinds of activities covered under Section 7 will aid in
determining when lawsuits to enforce statutory rights constitute
protected activity.
ii. Application of the NLRA in the NLRB and the Courts
The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have broadly
construed the types of activities that meet the “concerted” require-
ment of Section 7 conduct.34 Concerted activity clearly encompasses
situations where “two or more employees assert legal rights against
their employer.”35 The Board in Meyers Industries, Inc. expressed a
narrow reading of the term “concerted,” when it stated that only
“group” activity was protected, not activity undertaken by and on
behalf of the employee himself.36 But, in addition to group activity
30. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835-36 (1984) (observing that
Section 7 represents the primary means by which Congress implemented its purpose of
achieving industrial peace); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) (not-
ing that a dominant purpose of the NLRA is to foster “the right of employees to organize for
mutual aid without employer interference”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 33–34 (1937)(holding that employees have a “fundamental right” to organize and Section
7 is meant to safeguard this right).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
32. JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 83–84 (6th ed. 2012).
33. For a general discussion of these two requirements, see Ann C. Hodges, Can Compul-
sory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 187–200
(2003); see also William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Every-
thing Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 279–83 (2002).
34. See Michael D. Schwartz, Note, A Substantive Right to Class Proceedings: The False Conflict
Between the FAA and the NLRA, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2945, 2963–64 (2013).
35. John B. O’Keefe, Note, Preserving Collective-Action Rights in Employment Arbitration, 91
VA. L. REV. 823, 833 (2005).
36. 281 N.L.R.B. No. 882, 886 (1986).
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undertaken “in order to achieve common goals,”37 the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc. affirmed that concerted
activity includes individual employee conduct which “intends to in-
duce group activity,” or conduct by an individual employee who
“acts as a representative of at least one other employee.”38  In justify-
ing this broad reading, the Court explained that “[t]here is no
indication that Congress intended to limit this protection to situa-
tions in which an employee’s activity and that of his fellow
employees combine with one another in any particular way.”39 Nev-
ertheless, an individual employee cannot claim statutory protection
for activity undertaken solely “by and on behalf of the employee
himself.”40
With regard to the “mutual aid or protection” prong, the Su-
preme Court endorsed an expansive reading of this provision in
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB.41 The case involved a paper products manufac-
turer that had denied the union permission to distribute a
newsletter urging employees to support union membership and op-
pose the incorporation of the state “right-to-work” statute into a
revised state constitution.42 Upon determining that the distribution
of the newsletter was a protected action, the Court held that em-
ployees act for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection” whenever
their efforts are aimed at improving the terms and conditions of
employment, even if their conduct occurs outside the immediate
employer-employee relationship.43 The Court held that a narrower
interpretation of employee protections would “frustrate the policy
of the [NLRA] to protect the right of workers to act together to
better their working conditions.”44
In sum, Section 7 embodies the substantive right of employees to
act collectively to improve their working conditions.45  Courts have
generally found that this right to collective action enables employ-
ees to bring lawsuits challenging working conditions on a joint or
collective basis.46
37. 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 835.
40. Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. at 885.
41. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
42. Id. at 559–61.
43. Id. at 565–66. (providing that employee conduct is protected when it seeks “to im-
prove working conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums” and through
appeal to legislators.)
44. Id. at 567 (quoting NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962)).
45. See Katherine V. W. Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbi-
tration Under the Labor Law, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 164, 173–77 (2013).
46. See, e.g., Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming
that “a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees to achieve more favorable terms or
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A related question concerns whether individual employees can
waive their right to engage in concerted activity by entering into a
contract with their employer. The Supreme Court resolved this is-
sue in National Licorice Co. v. NLRB.47 The employment contract in
that case contained a provision that violated “the employees’ rights
to organize and bargain collectively guaranteed by §§ 7 and 8” of
the NLRA.48  The Court invalidated the provision and held that
“employers cannot set at naught the [NLRA] by inducing their
workmen to agree not to demand performance of the duties which
it imposes.”49  Similarly, the Court in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB deter-
mined that employers cannot use individual employment contracts
as a basis for waiving Section 7 rights.50  It ultimately concluded that
“[w]herever private contracts conflict with [the NLRA’s] functions,
they obviously must yield or the [the NLRA] would be reduced to a
futility.”51
As the preceding discussion suggests, the courts and the Board
have long endorsed a policy of broad enforcement of Section 7
rights.  This policy has been contested by recent Supreme Court
decisions that have strengthened the right of companies to compel
individual arbitration in consumer disputes.  The following discus-
sion will address the evolving federal law on arbitration, focusing
primarily on the text, purpose, and application of the FAA.
B. The FAA and the Development of Private Dispute Resolution
Studies suggest that as of 2003, nearly one quarter of private-sec-
tor nonunion employees were subject to arbitration agreements.52
Despite the prevalence of arbitration today, throughout the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, courts carefully scrutinized
predispute arbitration agreements and often declined to enforce
them.53
conditions of employment is ‘concerted activity’ under § 7”); Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB,
486 F.2d 686, 689 (1st Cir. 1973) (declaring that “the filing of a labor related civil action by a
group of employees is ordinarily a concerted activity protected by § 7, unless the employees
acted in bad faith”).
47. 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
48. Id. at 360.
49. Id. at 364.
50. 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
51. Id. at 337.
52. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst
the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 410 (2007) (reporting that 22.7% of
private nonunion employees were subject to arbitration in 2003).
53. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 1103, 1140 (2011).
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i. Text and Purpose of the FAA
In response to “widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments,”54 Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925.55
The drafters intended the FAA to establish procedural rules that
would not affect the substantive rights of parties in a contractual
dispute.56  The main purpose of the law “was to make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.”57
Section 2 of the FAA declared that written arbitration provisions
involving commercial or maritime matters “shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”58 If a contract provided
that future disputes be exclusively resolved through arbitration,
then under the Act, courts reviewing that contract were required to
enforce the contract on its terms.59
Congress intended the statute to govern disputes between
merchants “presumed to be of approximately equal bargaining
strength.”60  Acknowledging union concerns that the law would
compel arbitration in the employment context, the drafters of the
FAA emphasized that it is “not intended that [the Act] shall be an
act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the
merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing
with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do
it.”61  The legislative history of the FAA suggests that Congress did
54. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
55. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)).
56. H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924); Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: J. Hear-
ings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong.
37–38 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel for the New York State Chamber
of Commerce).
57. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (“An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as
other contracts.”).
58. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
59. See Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L.
REV. 767, 772 (2012) (“A fundamental principle underlying the FAA is to respect freedom of
contract.”).
60. Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101, 106, 113 (2006) (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court has engaged in “judicial lawmaking” in the last quarter century
by overly extending the scope of the FAA in a manner that “reflects judicial policy
preferences”).
61. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbi-
tration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, chair of the American Bar Association Commit-
tee that drafted the bill).
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not mean to create a system in which plaintiffs would be forced to
arbitrate their claims on an individual basis.
ii. Application of the FAA in the Courts
Although the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA was ini-
tially narrow, in the late twentieth century, the Court began to
expand the scope of the FAA. For example, in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court decided to uphold a
predispute arbitration clause.62 The case involved a claim brought
under the Sherman Antitrust Act over a dispute arising from a
franchise agreement that contained a mandatory arbitration provi-
sion.63  Recognizing “[t]he ‘liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements,’ ” the Court decided to enforce the arbitra-
tion clause.64 Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that a party
compelled to arbitration “does not forgo the substantive rights af-
forded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”65 In doing so, the Court rec-
ognized that arbitration is merely a procedural device, which
should not be used to deprive employees from effectively vindicat-
ing their substantive rights.
The Court in the 1991 case, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, fur-
ther broadened the reach of the FAA when it concluded that the
FAA required the arbitration of a claim brought under a federal
employment discrimination statute.66 In that case, an employee
filed a claim against his former employer, alleging a violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).67  The Court up-
held the contract after finding that “neither the text nor the
legislative history of the ADEA explicitly precludes arbitration.”68 In
addition, the Court rejected the employee’s concerns over bias in
arbitration proceedings, limited amount of discovery, lack of writ-
ten opinions, inequality in bargaining power, and absence of class
action relief.69  Still, as in Mitsubishi, the Court acknowledged that
62. 473 U.S. 614, 615 (1985).
63. Id. at 619–20.
64. Id. at 625 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983)).
65. Id. at 628.
66. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 30–33.
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arbitration does not prevent employees from vindicating their statu-
tory rights.70
While the Supreme Court in Gilmer found that a claim under an
employment discrimination statute can be subjected to compulsory
arbitration,71 the Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams addressed
whether and to what extent Section 1 of the FAA—which excludes
“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce”—covers private sector employees.72 The key issue centered
on the scope of the exempted “class of workers engaged in foreign
or in interstate commerce.”73 In resolving this issue, the Court
could have read the exemption broadly to encompass most employ-
ment agreements or narrowly to exclude only contracts involving
transportation workers.74  It ultimately held that “the text of the
FAA forecloses the construction of § 1 . . . which would exclude all
employment contracts from the FAA.”75  The Court reasoned that
the preceding references to two specific categories of workers—
“seamen” and “railroad employees”—suggest that Congress in-
tended to limit the exemption to those workers engaged in
transportation.76 This decision brought a wide array of employment
contracts under the scope of the FAA, which, in turn, made dis-
putes arising from such contracts subject to arbitration.
The Supreme Court reinforced its commitment to enforcing ar-
bitration agreements in the consumer context in CompuCredit Corp.
v. Greenwood.77  There, the Court considered whether a claim
brought under the federal Consumer Repair Organization Act must
be resolved in arbitration, as required by an arbitration clause of
the consumer contract.78  In the end, the Court adhered to the pre-
sumption that “the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to be
enforced according to its terms.”79 It further added that this pre-
sumption applies “even when the claims at issue are federal
statutory claims, unless the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by
70. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628) (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.”)
71. Id. at 26–27.
72. 532 U.S. 105, 105 (2001) (quoting FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1925)).
73. Id. at 109.
74. See id. at 114–18.
75. Id. at 119.
76. Id. at 121.
77. 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012).
78. Id. at 668–73.
79. Id. at 673.
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a contrary congressional command.’ ”80 Thus, barring a clear con-
gressional statement to the contrary, courts were to ensure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms.
With regard to contracts that are silent on the issue of class arbi-
tration, the Supreme Court ruled in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp. that imposing class arbitration on parties who
have not agreed to such a proceeding is inconsistent with the
FAA.81  The Court began by acknowledging the basic principle “that
arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’ ”82  Because “par-
ties are ‘generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as
they see fit,’ ”83 and “may also specify with whom they choose to arbi-
trate,”84 the Court reasoned that the absence of explicit contractual
language on the subject of class arbitration indicates that the par-
ties in this case did not consent to such a proceeding.85  Ultimately,
the Court concluded that “a party may not be compelled under the
FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis
for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”86
These developments in the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence
reveal the growing ascendancy of arbitration in the employment
context. A few general conclusions can be drawn in light of these
key developments. First, federal statutory claims are subject to arbi-
tration where parties have entered into predispute arbitration
agreements, provided that parties are able to vindicate their sub-
stantive rights. Second, the FAA governs arbitration agreements
involving most classes of employees, except for transportation work-
ers. Third, arbitration agreements are generally enforceable unless
Congress has clearly given pronouncements to the contrary. Finally,
neither courts nor arbitrators can impose class arbitration on par-
ties who have not explicitly agreed to it. As this judicial trend
toward the broad enforcement of arbitration agreements empowers
employers to use them to minimize their exposure to liability, it
impedes nonunion employees from exercising their fundamental
right to engage in collective action.
80. Id. at 669 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987)).
81. 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010).
82. Id. at 664 (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
83. Id. at 664 (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57
(1995)).
84. Id. at 664 (citing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002)).
85. Id. at 664–65.
86. Id. at 664.
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II. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE ENFORCEMENT OF CLASS WAIVERS
AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES’
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
The Supreme Court’s broad enforcement of arbitration has
given businesses added incentive to mandate private dispute resolu-
tion, as evidenced by the growing prevalence of predispute
arbitration agreements.87 Two recent decisions, AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion88 and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,89
have enlarged the scope of the FAA and enabled businesses to pre-
vent consumers and employees from aggregating their claims.
Against this backdrop of judicial support of arbitration, the NLRB’s
decision in D.R. Horton has reinforced protections for employees’
right to collective action under the NLRA. Since the Board’s ruling,
four federal circuit courts90 and numerous district courts91 have
held that the FAA compels the enforcement of class waivers in em-
ployment contracts.  And, most recently, the Fifth Circuit
overturned D.R. Horton in December 2013.92
This Part addresses the “showdown” between the courts and the
NLRB over the enforceability of class waivers in employment con-
tracts.93  First, it analyzes the rulings in Concepcion and Italian Colors,
which espouse the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”94
Second, this Part examines the Board’s latest effort to preserve the
“concerted pursuit of workplace grievances.”95 Third, it considers
the four circuit court decisions that have both adopted the Court’s
pro-arbitration stance and limited the Board’s authority over labor
disputes.  Finally, this Part highlights the need for reconciling the
FAA and the NLRA in a manner that conforms to the underlying
purposes of the two statutes. This statutory tension carries far-reach-
ing implications for the continuing relevance of the NLRA and for
the ability of employees to vindicate their rights.
87. See Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 20, at 883 (revealing that 92.9% of firms
incorporated arbitration clauses into their employment contracts); see also Colvin, supra note
52, at 408–11.
88. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
89. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
90. See discussion infra Part II.C.
91. For references to some of these cases, see infra note 138.
92. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
93. Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, The NLRB v. The Courts: Showdown
Over the Right to Collective Action in Workplace Disputes, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2014),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2406577##.
94. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.  at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
95. D.R. Horton, supra note 2, at *4.
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A. The Supreme Court Enforces Class Waivers in
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
In the 2011 case, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court up-
held a class action waiver clause in a cell phone contract against a
challenge that the waiver violated state contract law.96 The case was
brought by a pair of customers, the Concepcions, who filed a com-
plaint against AT&T, alleging that its offer of a free phone to
anyone who signed up for its service was fraudulent because the
company charged a sales tax based on the phone’s retail value.97 In
response, AT&T moved to compel arbitration, pursuant to the
mandatory arbitration provision in the contract.98 The Concepcions
opposed the motion, contending that the arbitration agreement
was unconscionable, and thus unenforceable, under California law
because it precluded them from invoking class proceedings.99 They
argued that a finding of unconscionability falls under the saving
clause in Section 2 of the FAA, which permits courts to refuse to
enforce arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”100
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts
the California judicial rule that barred enforcement of arbitration
on grounds of unconscionability.101 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, explained that the overarching purpose of the FAA “is to
‘ensure that private arbitration agreements are enforced according
to their terms.’ ”102  Finding that “nothing in the [FAA] suggests an
intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives,”103 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the provision mandating individual arbitration was valid
and enforceable.104 Although the Supreme Court broadly endorsed
the validity of class waivers in arbitration agreements, it neglected
to decide whether this holding extended to employment disputes
96. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1742–43.
97. Id. at 1744.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1745.
100. Id. at 1746 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2. See also Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849,
855 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (invalidating the class
action waiver in the cell phone contract because it was unconscionable).
101. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
102. Id. at 1748 (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664
(2010)).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1753.
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or whether class waivers should be enforced when they prevent par-
ties from effectively vindicating their rights.105
The Supreme Court addressed the latter question in June 2013
when it decided American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.106 In
that case, the Court enforced a class action waiver in a mandatory
arbitration provision of an agreement between merchants and a
major credit card company.107 The merchants, suing in a class ac-
tion, claimed that the credit card company violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act by forcing an unlawful tying arrangement on them.108
The company responded by filing a motion to compel individual
arbitration under the FAA.109 Prior to the dispute, the merchants
had signed a contract requiring arbitration of all future disputes
and a waiver precluding the parties from aggregating their
claims.110 The plaintiffs contended that a judge-made exception to
the FAA allows courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbi-
tration on the ground that the expense of individually arbitrating a
claim under a federal statute exceeds the potential recovery.111
As in Concepcion, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion. Rely-
ing on CompuCredit, Justice Scalia emphasized that claims alleging a
violation in a federal statute are subject to the same conditions, “un-
less the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a contrary
congressional command.’ ”112 Upon finding no congressional in-
tent that would require rejecting the class arbitration waiver, the
Court upheld the class action waiver.113 In addition, the Court ruled
that the effective-vindication doctrine does not constitute an ade-
quate basis for refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement.114
Justice Scalia stated that “the fact that it is not worth the expense
105. For a review of recent developments in the law of class actions and a discussion of
their potential implications, see Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litiga-
tion in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 639–47 (2012).
106. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2304 (2013). For a
thorough analysis of Italian Colors, see Case Note, Class Action—Class Arbitration Waivers—
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 127 HARV. L. REV. 278 (2013).
107. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2306.
108. Id. at 2308. A tying arrangement is defined as “an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) prod-
uct, or at least agrees he will not purchase the product from any other supplier.” N. Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958).
109. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 2306.
112. Id. at 2306 (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 181 (2012)).
113. Id. at 2306, 2312.
114. Id. at 2310–11.
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involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimi-
nation of the right to pursue that remedy.”115 By narrowing the
effective-vindication exception to class waivers, this decision deters
plaintiffs from seeking classwide relief and discourages them from
exercising their statutory rights due to the high cost of arbitrating
their claims individually.116
B. The NLRB Rules Class Waivers in Employment Arbitration
Agreements Unenforceable
The Board has recently attempted to carve out an exception to
the Supreme Court’s general enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements. In D.R. Horton,117 the Board considered whether a
home building company violates the NLRA when it requires its em-
ployees, as a condition of employment, to sign an agreement that
compels individual arbitration of all employment-related dis-
putes.118 A former employee, Michael Cuda, claimed that by
misclassifying him as a supervisor, the company exempted him
from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).119 Cuda initially sought
to arbitrate his complaint along with a national class of former su-
pervisors who claimed they had been similarly misclassified.120 The
company refused to arbitrate, citing the language of the mandatory
arbitration agreement that precluded class arbitration.121 In re-
sponse, Cuda filed an unfair labor practice charge before the
NLRB, alleging that the employment contract interferes with his
right under the NLRA to engage in collective action because it re-
quires him to submit his claim to individual arbitration.122
The Board agreed and provided three reasons to support its con-
clusion that the arbitration provision constituted an unfair labor
115. Id. at 2311 (emphasis in original).
116. See id. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2307, 2310; see also Jerett Yan, Recent Case, A
Lunatic’s Guide to Suing for $30: Class Action Arbitration, the Federal Arbitration Act and Unconscio-
nability after AT&T v. Concepcion, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 541, 552-53 (2011)
(discussing how limiting the availability of class proceedings would effectively preclude con-
sumers and employees from pursuing small dollar claims).
117. See D.R. Horton, supra note 2. For a thorough analysis of D.R. Horton, see Charles A.
Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute
Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013 (2013).
118. D.R. Horton, supra note 2, at *1–2.
119. Id. at *1; see also Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012)).
120. D.R. Horton, supra note 2, at *20.
121. Id. at *21.
122. See id. at *2.
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practice.123 First, it held that the mandatory arbitration agreement
prohibited the exercise of substantive rights protected by Section 7
of the NLRA.124 Quoting Eastex, the Board declared that “[i]t is well
settled that ‘mutual aid or protection’ includes employees’ efforts
to ‘improve terms or conditions of employment or otherwise im-
prove their lot as employees through channels outside the
employer-employee relationship,” including administrative and ju-
dicial forums.125 The Board determined that the employment
contract in this case “clearly and expressly bars employees from ex-
ercising their substantive rights” by imposing on them the
obligation “to refrain from bringing collective or class claims” ei-
ther in court or in arbitration.126
Second, the Board held that the employer violated Section
8(a)(1) by requiring employees to sign a binding arbitration agree-
ment that precluded them from engaging in collective action.127
The Board reflected on the broader concerns of federal labor pol-
icy and recognized that the NLRA expanded on the Norris-
LaGuardia Act’s128 prohibitions on “ ‘yellow-dog’-like” contracts,
which were aimed at preventing employees from joining unions.129
Consistent with the language and purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, the Board reasoned that a predispute arbitration agreement
imposed upon individual employees as a condition of employment
cannot be enforced where it prohibits them from pursuing their
claims collectively either in court or in arbitration.130
Third, the Board found no conflict between the NLRA and the
FAA.131 Even if the employment contract had said nothing about
arbitration, the Board emphasized, it would equally violate the
NLRA if it conditioned employment on an agreement to pursue
claims in court solely on an individual basis.132 The Board then con-
sidered the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gilmer, where the Court
enforced an agreement to arbitrate federal statutory claims, includ-
ing employment claims, but made clear that “the agreement may
123. See id. at *16–17.
124. See id. at *2–5.
125. Id. at *2 (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978)).
126. Id. at *5.
127. Id. at *5–8. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in” Section 7. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (banning “yellow-dog contracts,” in which the employee
agrees, as a condition of employment, not to be a member of a labor union).
129. D.R. Horton, supra note 2, at *7–8.
130. Id. at *8.
131. See id. at *11–16.
132. Id. at 11.
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not require a party ‘to forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute.’ ”133 Also, the Board noted that Gilmer involved an individ-
ual, rather than a class claim, and that the arbitration agreement in
that case did not contain a class waiver.134  Anticipating the objec-
tion that the Section 7 right to pursue collective action is merely
procedural, the Board maintained that “[t]he right to engage in
collective action—including collective legal action—is the core sub-
stantive right protected by the NLRA.”135 For these reasons, the
Board held that a ban on class proceedings in all forums abrogates
employees’ fundamental rights under the NLRA.136
C. Federal Courts Generally Enforce Class Waivers
Despite the NLRB’s attempt to preserve employees’ rights to seek
collective redress of workplace grievances,137 most federal courts
have since ignored or rejected the Board’s rationale and have en-
forced class waivers in employment arbitration agreements.138  Only
one district court to date has applied D.R. Horton and refused to
enforce the class arbitration waiver.139  This Section will focus on
four recent federal circuit court cases that deal with employment
contracts containing class waivers, all of which have declared such
agreements valid and enforceable.
In January 2013, the Eighth Circuit in Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.,
decided whether to allow a former employee to bring a class action
133. Id. at 12; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
134. D.R. Horton, supra note 2, at *12.
135. Id. (emphasis in original).
136. Id.
137. See id., at *2–4.
138. See, e.g., Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (holding that a class action waiver provision did not render an employment arbitration
agreement unenforceable under California law); Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc.,
870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 838–41 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that an arbitration agreement was
neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable, and thus not unenforceable, due to a
class action waiver provision); DeLock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 883 F. Supp.2d 784,
789–91 (E.D. Ark. 2012) (finding that a class action waiver in an employment contract was
enforceable despite employee’s right under the NLRA to engage in collective action about
workplace grievances). See also Michael D. Schwartz, Note, A Substantive Right to Class Proceed-
ings: The False Conflict Between the FAA and the NLRA, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2945, 2973–77
(2013) (analyzing federal and state courts that have enforced class waivers in the employ-
ment setting since D.R. Horton).
139. Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-779-bbc, 2012 WL 1242318, *6–8
(W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012) (invalidating a collective action waiver in an employment arbitra-
tion agreement); id. at *5 (“Particularly because defendant develops no argument that the
Board has interpreted the NLRA incorrectly, I see no reason to question the Board’s judg-
ment in this instance.”).
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against a company, alleging violations of the FLSA.140  Owen had
signed a contract at the time of hiring, whereby she agreed to re-
solve all future claims in binding arbitration and to waive the right
to bring claims on behalf of a class.141  She claimed that the passage
of the NLRA “amounted to a congressional declaration that it was
the ‘public policy of the United States’ . . . to protect workers’ rights
to engage in concerted activities and that this declaration came
‘seven years after the passage of the FAA.’ ”142 Although the FAA
was originally enacted in 1925, the court observed, it was reenacted
in 1947—twelve years after the NLRA and nine years after the
FLSA.143
Owen also relied on the NLRB’s holding in D.R. Horton in assert-
ing that “there is an inherent conflict between the FLSA and the
FAA” and that class waivers infringe on rights protected by Section
7 of the NLRA.144 But the court dismissed this argument, stressing it
owed “no deference” to the Board’s “interpretation of Supreme
Court precedent.”145 Given the absence of any contrary congres-
sional command from the FLSA that a right to pursue class claims
overrides the FAA mandate in favor of arbitration, the court held
that the mandatory arbitration agreement was enforceable.146
Seven months later, in Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, LLP, the Sec-
ond Circuit decided whether a class action waiver in an arbitration
agreement may be invalidated where it eliminates the financial in-
centive to pursue statutory claims.147 An accountant filed a class
action, claiming that her former employer misclassified and ex-
cluded her from the FLSA’s overtime protections.148 Sutherland
had signed an agreement that mandated arbitration of all employ-
ment-related claims and that proscribed “any class or collective
proceedings in the arbitration.”149 The court began by finding no
“contrary congressional command” under the FLSA that required it
to reject the class arbitration waiver.150 In addition, Sutherland ar-
gued the class waiver prevented her from vindicating her rights due
140. 702 F.3d 1050, 1051 (8th Cir. 2013).
141. See id.
142. Id. at 1053.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1054.
146. Id. at 1055.
147. 726 F.3d 290, 292 (2nd Cir. 2013).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 294.
150. Id. at 296.
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to the prohibitive cost of resolving her claims via individual arbitra-
tion.151 But the court, relying on Italian Colors, held that the
“effective vindication doctrine” cannot be invoked to invalidate the
class action waiver.152  Like the Eighth Circuit, the court notably re-
fused to follow D.R. Horton because, in its view, the Board had
encroached upon federal statutes unrelated to the NLRA, namely
the FAA.153
Within two weeks of the Second Circuit’s ruling, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP determined the arbitrability
of state wage and hour claims, where the plaintiff alleged to have
been prejudiced as a result of her former employer’s delay in assert-
ing its right. Ernst & Young, LLP determined the arbitrability of
state wage and hour claims where the plaintiff alleged to compel
arbitration.154 Richards, who had contractually agreed to exclusively
resolve all future disputes in individual arbitration, claimed that
“she was prejudiced because there was litigation on the merits, and,
as a result, some of her claims were dismissed” by the district
court.155 But the court rejected this argument on the ground that
the dismissal without prejudice of the wage and hour claims was not
a decision on the merits.156
In addition, Richards urged the court to consider the NLRB’s
decision in D.R. Horton to deny enforcement of the mandatory arbi-
tration provision.157 The court, however, declined to do so, noting
that “the only court of appeals, and the overwhelming number of
district courts, to have considered the issue have determined that
they should not defer to the NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton be-
cause it conflicts with the explicit pronouncements of the Supreme
Court concerning the policies undergirding the [FAA].”158 With its
decision, the Ninth Circuit repudiated D.R. Horton and reinforced
the uniformity among federal courts in consistently enforcing class
waivers in employment arbitration agreements.
Finally, on December of 2013, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
Board’s decision in D.R. Horton, holding that the Board did not give
proper weight to the FAA.159 Although the court recognized that
collective and class claims constitute protected concerted activity
151. Id. at 298.
152. See id. at 298–99.
153. See id. at 297 n.8.
154. 734 F.3d 871, 871 (9th Cir. 2013).
155. Id. at 873.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 873–74.
158. Id.
159. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d  at 345.
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under Section 7 of the NLRA, it emphasized that the “use of class
procedures . . . is not a substantive right.”160 The court also noted
that the arbitration agreement did not fall within the savings clause
and that the NLRA does not contain an express congressional com-
mand to override the FAA.161 Accordingly, the court determined
that the arbitration agreement was enforceable according to its
terms.162 This ruling represents a major setback for nonunion em-
ployees, as it makes filing joint, class, or collective employment-
related claims in any forum increasingly difficult.
D. The Need for Reform: Preserving Section 7 Rights in
the Wake of Concepcion
To date, the Supreme Court has not weighed in on D.R. Horton.
It is difficult to predict whether the NLRB will try to appeal the
Fifth Circuit’s decision, particularly after its petition for rehearing
en banc was denied.163 The Board probably will not want to pursue
this case to the Supreme Court and will choose instead to adhere to
its holding in D.R. Horton until the high court resolves the matter.
But even if the Board were to file a petition for appeal to the Su-
preme Court, it is doubtful the Court will grant certiorari anytime
soon.  This is especially so given the consistency and uniformity
among federal courts in broadly recognizing and enforcing
mandatory arbitration agreements.
The courts’ liberal interpretation of the FAA encourages busi-
nesses to draft employment contracts in a way that insulates them
from potential liability.164 Although Concepcion and Italian Colors
both involved consumer contracts,165 they have given employers ad-
ded incentive to formulate agreements that either explicitly or
160. Id. at 357.
161. Id. at 358–60.
162. Id. at 362.
163. Several commentators covering the Fifth Circuit’s denial of the NLRB petition have
speculated about the chances of further appeal to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Keith J.
Brodie, NLRB DR Horton Rehearing Denied, LEXOLOGY, Apr.17, 2014, http://www.lexology
.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c0d01a65-23f7-4a45-b6f2-a9d4113e7eb4; Ronald J. Kramer, Re-
jected: Fifth Circuit Denied NLRB Petition for Rehearing En Banc in D.R. Horton, LEXOLOGY, Apr.
16, 2014, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9f36c866-dc7e-4b41-9696-1101979
0d29b.
164. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 105 at 627 (noting how the broad holding in Con-
cepcion makes it likely that most arbitration agreements will be upheld).
165. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (cell phone contract);
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (credit card acceptance
agreement)
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implicitly preclude employees from invoking class proceedings.166
Now that the Supreme Court has rejected the vindication of rights
doctrine,167 employees will largely be unable to pursue small-dollar
claims, given the prohibitive expense of arbitrating on an individual
basis.168
Many commentators have pointed to evidence of bias in arbitra-
tion proceedings.169 Because most employees are unfamiliar with
arbitration, they are at a disadvantage relative to employers who
may use the same arbitration provider repeatedly. Arbitration thus
exhibits a “repeat player effect,” which allows employers and their
attorneys to draw on the skill and expertise they have acquired in
prior cases in developing a legal strategy, which they could use in
defending against claims brought by their employees who lack simi-
lar sophistication.170
This is particularly so when employers have contractually re-
quired employees to resolve common question claims in individual
arbitration. There, the stakes of the employer and each employee
differ dramatically, “as do their corresponding incentives to invest
in making their cases on common questions.”171 While each plain-
tiff invests up to the expected recovery on his or her particular
claims, the defendant invests in a way that “minimizes its classwide
exposure to the costs of liability and litigation in the aggregate, not
166. See Rebecca Wolf, Comment, “To a Hammer Everything Looks Like a Nail”: The Supreme
Court’s Misapplication of the Vindication of Rights Doctrine, 21 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
951, 992–93 (2013).
167. Id. at 993; see also Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct.  at 2310–11.
168. See Wolf, supra note 166, at 993–94. For a detailed discussion of the costs of individu-
ally arbitrating employment disputes, see Michelle Eviston & Richard Bales, Capping the Costs
of Consumer and Employment Arbitration, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 903, 909–10.
[The American Arbitration Association (“AAA”)] uses the Commercial Fee Schedule
for disputes arising out of individually-negotiated employment agreements and con-
tracts. Here, however, the AAA does not provide any caps for small claims like it does
for consumer disputes. Thus, if an employee sues his or her employer alleging a Title
VII violation and seeking $300,000 in actual damages, he or she would owe a $2,800
filing fee and a $1,250 case service fee.
Id. at 910. See also Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingency Fee Contracts, 59
VAND. L. REV. 727, 736–42 (2006) (examining the cost structure of arbitration, as compared
to litigation).
169. See, e.g., Lisa Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power: An Alternative Account for the Repeat
Player Effect in Employment Arbitration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, Chicago, Ill., Jan. 3-5, 1998, at *35-37; David
Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcion’s Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process: The
Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1151, 1158–70 (2013).
170. See Bingham, supra note 169, at *40.
171. Korn & Rosenberg, supra note 169, at 1153.
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for any particular claim.”172 The resulting “asymmetry in stakes be-
tween the single-shot plaintiff and the repeat-player defendant”
confers on the defendant a superior bargaining position relative to
the plaintiff, skewing the outcome of individual arbitration in its
favor.173 Individual employment arbitration tends to inure to the
benefit of employers—the repeat players—because arbitration
providers have a strong incentive to rule in their favor in order to
retain their business.174 This systemic bias manifests itself particu-
larly in the nonunion context, where individual employees cannot
avail themselves of the protections provided by the collective bar-
gaining agreement. In labor arbitration, by contrast, the union is
typically a repeat player, so the bias in favor of the employer is offset
by the bias in favor of the union.
In spite of the generally negative response to D.R. Horton by fed-
eral courts and the questions raised by Concepcion and Italian Colors,
the enforceability of class waivers in predispute arbitration agree-
ments remains a hotly contested issue. A number of NLRB
administrative law judges (“ALJs”) have applied D.R. Horton to inval-
idate class action waivers, and accordingly, have struck down
mandatory arbitration agreements that contain such waivers on the
ground that they violate the NLRA. For example, on August 29,
2013, an ALJ found that an individual arbitration agreement was
unlawful under D.R. Horton.175
The company argued that D.R. Horton is void because the Board
lacked a quorum when it issued the decision and, alternatively, that
it was wrongly decided as evident from its poor reception among
federal circuit and district courts.176 But in a footnote, the ALJ dis-
missed those claims, affirming that it is “bound by Board precedent
unless and until it is reversed by the Board itself or the Supreme
Court.”177 Prior to that decision, on August 19, 2013, another NLRB
ALJ similarly rejected arguments concerning the validity of D.R.
Horton.178 The company in that case challenged D.R. Horton on the
basis that it is inconsistent with the FAA and Supreme Court prece-
dent.179 Acknowledging that it “is undeniable that increasingly the
172. Id. at 1154.
173. Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 710 (2013).
174. Korn & Rosenberg, supra note 169 at 1159-61.
175. Gamestop, Corp., Case 20-CA-080487, 2013 WL 4648418, at *10 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges, Aug. 29, 2013).
176. See id. at *10 n.3.
177. Id.
178. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC, Case 14-CA-094714, 2013 WL 4427452, at *3 (N.L.R.B.
Div. of Judges Aug. 19, 2013).
179. See id. at *5.
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Supreme Court has shown great deference to enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements,” the ALJ ultimately concluded that “the
Supreme Court does not expressly overrule the finding in D.R. Hor-
ton.”180 Given the widespread discordance between the NLRB and
most federal courts about the continuing validity of D.R. Horton, the
issue is expected to eventually make its way to the Supreme
Court.181
As the practice of mandating individual arbitration becomes
more prevalent, employees will face greater hurdles in accessing
class proceedings—a result which would have dire consequences
for employees seeking to vindicate their fundamental rights under
the NLRA.182 To ensure that the right to collective action is not
eviscerated, Congress must recognize the urgency of restoring the
equality of bargaining power that the NLRA set out to accomplish,
and it must respond accordingly by taking legislative action.
III. AVENUES FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF THE RIGHT
TO COLLECTIVE LEGAL ACTION
The Fifth Circuit’s reversal of D.R. Horton and the Supreme
Court’s FAA arbitration jurisprudence prompt grave concerns
about the plausibility of reform through the courts.  This judicial
trend further highlights the urgency of a legislative solution to pro-
tect the rights of employees from being foreclosed by arbitration
agreements containing class waivers. Congress, in response to pub-
lic pressure, has started to consider proposals to amend the FAA
and the rules governing arbitration. Most prominently, the Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act (AFA) was introduced for the first time in 2007 in
response to Supreme Court decisions expansively interpreting the
FAA.183 Reactions to this measure have been mixed. Although some
commentators have extolled the merits of this proposed reform,184
180. Id. at *6.
181. See John Lewis & Todd A. Dawson, Fifth Circuit Rejects NLRB’s D.R. Horton Decision—
Too Soon For Champagne?, MONDAQ, Dec. 9, 2013, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/
279886/employment+litigation+%20tribunals/Fifth+Circuit+Rejects+NLRBs+DR+Horton+
Decision+Too+Soon+For+Champagne.
182. Yan, supra note 116, at 551–52.
183. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007). “[N]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be
valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute,
antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.” Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong.
§ 402 (2013).
184. See Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act: It’s All About
the Separation of Powers, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 151, 157 (2009) (arguing that the AFA
would restore consumers’ right to sue and should therefore be enacted by Congress).
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others have expressed some concern that either it goes too far185 or
not far enough.186
This Part will explore the AFA—which would essentially abolish
compulsory arbitration in most contexts—and will analyze its bene-
fits and drawbacks. In addition, this Part will highlight the critical
importance of enacting statutory reform that codifies the NLRB’s
decision in D.R. Horton. This proposed legislation would go a long
way in restoring employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in concerted
activity while at the same time preserving the advantages of speed,
cost, and accessibility that individual arbitration provides. Such a
law would enable employees to bring joint, or collective, claims
against their employers in an arbitral or judicial forum, thereby giv-
ing them the opportunity to effectively vindicate their statutory
rights. Finally, this Part will attempt to foresee the continuing rele-
vance of mandatory employment arbitration, with the aim of
forecasting the future of concerted activity in the years to come.
A. Existing Proposal for Reform: The Arbitration Fairness Act
In response to a series of judicial decisions that were seen to
erode protections for consumers and employees, Senator Al
Franken in 2013 put forth the most recent version of the AFA,
which declares that “no predispute arbitration agreement shall be
valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment,
consumer, franchise or civil rights dispute.”187 This bill has drawn
considerable support in the Senate, yet it has so far been unable to
obtain the requisite number of votes to get past committee.188
185. See, e.g., Eviston & Bales, supra note 169 at 906–07 (arguing that the AFA attempts to
address legitimate concerns relating to private arbitration but does little to consider the high
costs of making arbitration optional); Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not
and Should Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 311–14 (2012) (arguing that
the total prohibition of employer-imposed mandatory arbitration will thwart the ability of
employees to access a forum in which to adjudicate their claims); Miles B. Farmer, Note,
Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121 YALE L.J. 2346, 2362–63 (2012)
(arguing that the AFA would disproportionately impose costs on companies and on the judi-
cial system, introduce transaction costs, and undermine the efficiency advantage that
arbitration provides).
186. See Joshua T. Mandelbaum, Note, Stuck in a Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve
the Problems of Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the Consumer Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1075,
1100–02 (2009).
187. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. § 402 (2013); Arbitration Fair-
ness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 402(2013).
188. See Bill Summary & Status: 113th Congress (2013-2014): S.878 CRS Summary (Libr.
of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:S.878: (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
As of December 17, 2013, the AFA has 24 cosponsors in the Senate.
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The AFA has garnered support from those who seek an end to
predispute arbitration both on empirical and egalitarian
grounds.189 Proponents argue that voluntary, post-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements are fairer to employees than binding predispute
arbitration agreements, particularly where the party with a stronger
bargaining position (typically the employer) exclusively determines
whether to impose a mandatory arbitration regime.190 Predispute
agreements, on the one hand, tend to be executed when employees
feel compelled to sign in order to obtain or maintain their jobs.191
On the other hand, post-dispute agreements are more likely to be
voluntary in the sense that they take place when employees can
make a more informed decision about the merits and drawbacks of
arbitration as compared to litigation.192
Yet in spite of those who favor making arbitration clauses unen-
forceable, a number of observers note that the AFA fails to address
several of the problems endemic to the existing mandatory arbitra-
tion regime and would continue to allow companies to take
advantage of consumers and employees.193 The AFA has also been
criticized for not dealing with the significant costs of arbitration
and doing little to confront the problems of limited discovery or
biased arbitrators.194 Many commentators believe that the AFA pro-
poses a broad array of changes that would effectively nullify the
benefits of arbitration.195  According to Theodore St. Antoine, the
AFA “brings a hammer to bear on mandatory arbitration when the
need is for a scalpel.”196  Such critics refer to win rates in employ-
ment arbitration compared to those in litigation as a basis for
contending that mandatory arbitration not only can be favorable to
individual employees but also is often “their only feasible option.”197
189. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1247, 1331 (2009); Jean R. Sternlight, Introduction: Dreaming About Arbitration Reform, 8 NEV.
L.J. 1, 3 (2007).
190. See Schwartz, supra note 189, at 1258–59.
191. See id.
192. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Employment Arbitration: Keeping it Fair, Keeping it
Lawful, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 629, 635 (2010).
193. See Mandelbaum, supra note 186, at 1100–02.
194. See id.
195. See George Padis, Note, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming Consumer and Employment
Arbitration and Class Actions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 665, 669 (arguing that the AFA would effectively
cancel the practical advantages of engaging in arbitration by rendering arbitration clauses
nonbinding and unenforceable);
196. St. Antoine, supra note 192, at 644. (“Total prohibition of pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate . . . would pose a major obstacle to the real-life fulfillment of the purposes of antidis-
crimination legislation for many, if not most, of the intended beneficiaries.”).
197. Id. at 640.
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The AFA promises comprehensive reform that aims to achieve a
more balanced system of arbitration, where the disadvantages fall
disproportionately on various classes of plaintiffs. But in a Congress
dominated by powerful special interest groups, such a broad and
far-reaching proposal will likely fail to obtain substantial political
support.  A more narrowly-tailored approach to arbitration reform
that focuses on a particular class of plaintiffs—in this case, nonun-
ion employees—will not only be more politically feasible, but also
more sensitive to concerns over preserving the advantages of
arbitration.
Yet the pitfalls of the AFA go beyond the practical and normative
challenges that stand in the way of its passage. The AFA also lacks
strong legal underpinnings. By invalidating predispute arbitration
agreements that require arbitration of antitrust, civil rights, con-
sumer, and employment disputes, this proposed law encroaches on
a host of federal statutes. Even if the AFA were enacted into law, it is
foreseeable that it will face numerous challenges in the courts,
which have tended to view arbitration as a favorable means of
resolving disputes.
B. Amending the FAA to Address the Problem of Class Waivers
This Note proposes that Congress formulate an amendment to
the FAA that invalidates employment arbitration agreements con-
taining class waivers, where such waivers deny employees their
substantive right to engage in concerted activity. Unlike the AFA,
which would largely abolish predispute arbitration agreements in
antitrust, civil rights, consumer, and employment disputes,198 this
reform is narrowly tailored to the goal of safeguarding specific
rights under federal labor law. It would not require employers to
depart from the common practice of mandating individual arbitra-
tion of all claims arising during the course of work.199 Nor would it
apply to a broad array of disputes and potentially infringe on a
number of federal statutes.
Rather, this proposal calls for a statutory reform limited to the
employment context. Such a reform would render class waivers in
employment contracts unenforceable when they force nonunion
198. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. § 402(a) (2013). See also Sarah
Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s
Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 458–59 (2011); Peter B. Rutledge, Who
Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 267, 267–68 (2008); Malin, supra note 186 at 311–14.
199. See Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 20, at 883.
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employees to give up their right to file joint or collective claims both
in court and in arbitration.
i. A Proposal to Rescue Horton
This proposed amendment to the FAA would resuscitate the
Board’s holdings in D.R. Horton.  Drawing on the basic structure of
the AFA, this amendment would add a fourth chapter to the FAA
entitled “Arbitration of Employment Disputes,” which would pro-
vide that no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or
enforceable if the following two conditions are met: (1) such agree-
ment requires arbitration of an employment dispute, and (2) such
agreement contains a waiver precluding parties from engaging in
any class proceeding, either in an arbitral or judicial forum. These
two conditions are essential to limit the scope of the amendment to
cases in the employment context where employees are forced to
accept class waiver provisions in mandatory arbitration agreements.
An amendment to the FAA would undoubtedly have significant
implications, particularly for nonunion employees who often can-
not access a negotiated grievance procedure or rely on
representatives to bring claims on their behalf. To avoid any undue
interference with union-management relations, this amendment
would not apply to any arbitration provision in a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Although this proposal would leave unionized
workplaces largely unaffected, it would nonetheless secure to non-
union employees some of the basic protections afforded to
employees under a collective bargaining regime. Allowing employ-
ees to seek class adjudication of claims before a court or arbitrator
will help sustain a central feature of national labor policy: the right
to seek collective legal redress of workplace grievances.200 That does
not mean that this proposal would invalidate, or render unenforce-
able, all mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment
context that contain class waivers. Rather, it would mean that such
agreements cannot require employees to refrain from bringing col-
lective claims in any forum. It would ensure, in other words, that
employees are allowed to aggregate their claims in court or
arbitration.
200. D.R. Horton, supra note 2, at *8–9 (discussing that the NLRA protects employees’
ability to pursue workplace grievances collectively through litigation or in arbitration); see also
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978) (noting that the NLRA “protects employees
from retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve working conditions through
resort to administrative and judicial forums”).
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By permitting plaintiffs to pursue a collective legal remedy, this
statutory amendment would help reconcile the NLRA and the FAA.
It would not bar employers from requiring employees to sign
mandatory arbitration clauses and forgo access to a judicial forum.
Neither Section 7 nor D.R. Horton necessarily guarantees employees
access to a trial where they can resolve their employment-related
claims.201 As long as class arbitration is a viable option and genuine
substitute for class action litigation, employers would be able to
continue enforcing predispute arbitration agreements. Moreover,
the proposed amendment would not interfere with the FAA’s man-
date to arbitrate contractual disputes nor would it flout the
Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence as it relates to the em-
ployment context.202 It would only codify what the case law
supports—that arbitration agreements cannot be interpreted to
abridge the substantive rights of employees under the NLRA.203 As
has been emphasized throughout, foremost among these rights is
the collective redress of workplace grievances.
ii. Justifications and Potential Criticisms
of the Proposed Amendment
It is likely that this proposal will elicit some strong objections.
Critics of this proposal may focus on the potentially adverse impact
it will bear on employers. In the event that this reform is introduced
in Congress, businesses across the country would likely try to pre-
vent its passage. They would accordingly direct their lobbying
efforts to prevent it from gaining political support and block it from
passing to the floor of either house, as they have achieved with the
AFA.204 But assuming the bill is enacted into law, companies would
continue to mount obstacles to avoid being held accountable by
their employees. After all, it is highly unlikely that management
201. D.R. Horton, supra note 2, at *17 (noting that “arbitration has become a central
pillar of Federal labor relations policy” and explaining that its “holding rests not on the
conflict between the compelled waiver of the right to act collectively in any forum, judicial or
arbitral, in an effort to vindicate workplace rights and the NLRA.”).
202. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (enforcing
individual employees’ agreements to arbitrate claims under the ADEA against their
employer).
203. Id. at 26 (expressing the principle that arbitration clauses may not require a party to
“forgo the substantive rights afforded by [a] statute”).
204. David Lazarus, Bill Aims to Restore Consumers’ Right to Sue, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Oct.
28, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/18/business/la-fi-lazarus-20111018. Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (referring to the Committee on
the Judiciary); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (referring to the Committee on the
Judiciary).
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would support making arbitration truly voluntary, either before or
after the dispute arises.205 A number of employment law scholars
have written extensively on the pro-management incentives offered
by predispute arbitration agreements, giving reason to think that
employers would resist efforts to make post-dispute arbitration an
option for resolving workplace grievances. While this suggested re-
form will likely face stern opposition from industry groups before
and after its passage, it is probable that it will also generate support
from pro-labor and consumer advocacy groups that stand to benefit
from legislation that ends the practice of including class waivers in
predispute binding arbitration clauses.206
Additionally, businesses may decide to abandon arbitration en-
tirely if employees had the opportunity to bring their claims
collectively in arbitration. This may well be a realistic possibility, es-
pecially for employers that have sought to avoid defending against
class claims by attaching class waivers in predispute individual arbi-
tration agreements. The abandonment of arbitration may not be
desirable for employees, many of whom would find it more costly
and time-consuming to pursue their claims in court.207 But it is
doubtful that employers will universally discontinue their practice
of requiring employees to agree to arbitration as a condition of em-
ployment. Arbitration procedures, moreover, are relatively flexible
and can be structured to allow collective adjudication of employ-
ment-related claims in a forum that is generally more efficient and
informal than litigation.208
205. E.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 92
(2001) (arguing that, for employers, “the sensible strategy is to agree to arbitrate only if
everything can be included, and that almost necessarily means an agreement before any dis-
pute arises”); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 559, 567 (2001) (explaining that
“postdispute arbitration, in all but the rarest cases, will not be offered by one party or ac-
cepted by the other”).
206. A host of advocacy organizations have expressed their support of the AFA, who
would likely back the more limited reform I propose. For a letter to Members of the House
Committee on the Judiciary signed by these organizations, see Consumer, Labor, and Civil Rights
Groups Support the Arbitration Fairness Act, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER (Jul. 26, 2010),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/letter-afa-support-7-26-10.pdf.
207. John B. O’Keefe, Note, Preserving Collective Rights in Employment Arbitration, 91 VA. L.
REV. 823, 838–39 (2005).
208. The American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) issued Supplementary Rules for
Class Arbitration following the Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,
539 U.S. 444 (2003). These rules govern proceedings brought as class arbitrations. See AAA
Policy on Class Arbitration, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (Jul. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_003840. See also Supplementary Rules for
Class Arbitrations, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (Oct. 8, 2003), available at https://
www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/document/dgdf/
mda0/~edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf.
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Critics may also contend that statutory reform is premature and
insist on pursuing further judicial review. But while the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s reversal of D.R. Horton has been hailed as a “win for
businesses,”209 the Board may choose not to acquiesce and continue
to invalidate certain class waivers in mandatory arbitration agree-
ments until the Supreme Court rules on the issue. Likewise, the
Fifth Circuit’s ruling will probably not affect future decisions of
NLRB administrative law judges, who will probably apply the
Board’s reasoning and reach similar conclusions. Although the
Fifth Circuit’s decision would perhaps be binding on district courts
in that jurisdiction, it is possible that federal courts in other circuits
may decline to take the same approach. Even though this particular
ruling may not signal the death knell for collective legal action in
workplace disputes, it nevertheless undercuts the Board’s authority
over the interpretation of the NLRA, and it chips away at the capac-
ity of employees to vindicate their statutory rights.  Legislative
action is therefore necessary not only to reconcile the FAA and the
NLRA but also to restore the substantive right to class proceedings.
Following Concepcion, the law governing class actions and class ar-
bitration has been steadily shaped according to the interests of
corporate defendants who benefit from strong judicial enforcement
of individual arbitration. The Supreme Court has in recent years
been reluctant to acknowledge the tension between federal statu-
tory rights (e.g., to concerted activity) and the FAA’s mandate to
arbitrate claims.210 Congressional action must therefore be deliber-
ate and explicit in order to permit plaintiffs to effectively vindicate
their statutory rights. Such action must also be appropriately tai-
lored to the goal of providing employees with the opportunity to
aggregate their claims (in court or in arbitration) while not unduly
restricting the ability of employers to draft predispute arbitration
agreements.
Overall, however, the benefits of the reform outweigh any poten-
tial concerns. This suggested reform would preserve employee
protections under the NLRA and strengthen the legitimacy of the
NLRB in resolving labor disputes. It would restore the recognition
that “collective legal action” is the “core substantive right” protected
by national labor law.211 Preserving this right is especially important
209. The Associated Press, Court Blocks Labor Board on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/business/court-blocks-labor-board-on-lawsuits.html?_
r=0.
210. See Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L.
REV. 767, 781–91 (2012)
211. D.R. Horton, supra note 2, at *12.
272 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:1
to nonunion employees, who make up the vast majority of the pri-
vate-sector workforce. Unlike unionized employees who can avail
themselves of the procedures governing labor arbitration, these in-
dividual employees do not enjoy the protections afforded by
collective bargaining agreements, yet they are still pressured by
their employers to relinquish their right to collective action.212
Given the Supreme Court’s liberal enforcement of the FAA, this
amendment would ensure that national labor policy is not dis-
placed by the Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s liberal enforcement of predispute arbitra-
tion agreements, coupled with the Fifth Circuit’s reversal of D.R.
Horton, highlights the pressing need for congressional action aimed
at safeguarding the substantive rights of private sector employees
under Section 7 of the NLRA. An amendment to the FAA prohibit-
ing class waivers in employment disputes will lead future courts to
bar the enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements that un-
duly constrain the ability of employees to aggregate their claims. It
will, in turn, discourage employers from drafting contracts that
compel employees to resolve future claims in individual arbitration.
Finally, this amendment will strengthen the authority of the NLRB,
permitting it to carry out its statutory duty to protect employees’
right to concerted activity. By enabling employees to vindicate their
substantive rights, this proposed amendment will help restore one
of the chief purposes of the NLRA: to promote equal bargaining
power in the workplace.
What is urgently needed is congressional action to preserve the
right to collective action in employment disputes. Legislators would
do well to heed the words of the trade unionist, Samuel Gompers:
“Do I believe in arbitration? I do. But not in arbitration between the
lion and the lamb, in which the lamb is in the morning found in-
side the lion.”213 Congress should reform the FAA to ensure that
212. Patricia Lynch, Barbara Crutchfield George & Mary Jane Dundas, Employment Arbitra-
tion Agreements in the Non-Union Workplace: Failure to Meet Minimal Standards of Fairness?, CAL.
STATE UNIV., NORTHRIDGE, available at http://www.csun.edu/~bz51361/elq/elq1.pdf.
213. The Samuel Gompers Papers, SG Quotations, UNIV. OF MD., available at http://www
.gompers.umd.edu/quotes.htm (collection of quotations by Samuel Gompers). The Samuel
Gompers Papers, a project at the University of Maryland, “collects, annotates, and makes
available primary sources of American labor history.” The Samuel Gompers Papers, UNIV. OF
MD., available at http://www.gompers.umd.edu/project.htm). Quote originally appeared in
the ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS on Feb. 10, 1888.
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the arbitration of workplace grievances be carried out between
equals and to protect the substantive rights of employees from be-
ing swallowed up by the strategic interests of their employers.

